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We examine the classical contents of quantum games. It is shown that a quantum strategy can
be interpreted as a classical strategy with effective density-dependent game matrices composed of
transposed matrix elements. In particular, successful quantum strategies in dilemma games are
interpreted in terms of a symmetrized game matrix that corresponds to an altruistic game plan.
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Information processing with quantum mechanical bits,
or qubits, has become a major area of research activi-
ties. Among them, the quantum game [1, 2, 3] occu-
pies a somewhat peculiar position. This is because usual
applications of game theory – sociology, economics, evo-
lutionary biology [4, 5, 6] – are so far removed from the
realm of quantum mechanics. It would be fair to say that
quantum game theory has mostly been regarded as, and
indeed pursued as, an object of pure intellectual curiosity.
It is then somewhat puzzling to see quantum strategies
“succeed” in some of the long-standing problems of clas-
sical game theory, whose solutions usually call for rather
involved concepts and techniques. We cannot help won-
dering whether it is just a coincidence. Could it be that
the quantum game theory amounts to an effective short-
hand for advanced classical solutions?
In this article, we set out to give an answer to such
questions by examining in detail the working of quan-
tum strategies in a two-by-two game. When the quan-
tum correlations are present, the classical separation of
strategies of two players is in general not guaranteed.
Also, the correlations result in purely quantum compo-
nent in the payoff functions. However, it is pointed out
that there is a particular choice of quantum strategies
that ensures both classical separability and intactness of
classical payoff functions. We show that this particu-
lar set of strategies, which we call pseudoclassical, can
be reinterpreted as a classical game played with a mix-
ture of altruistic game plans [7, 8, 9]. We further show,
through numerical examples on the well-known case of
the prisoner’s dilemma, that the altruism effectively in-
corporated in the pseudoclassical treatment is indeed at
the core of the success of quantum strategies.
We consider a symmetric two strategy game, described
by a Hermitian operator Q that is to be specified later,
and played by two players with quantum strategies |α〉
and |β〉, both of which are linear combinations of basis
strategy vectors |0〉 and |1〉. We set
|αβ〉 = Uαβ |00〉 (1)
The unitary rotation matrix Uαβ is given by Uαβ =
Uα
⊗
Uβ where Uα and Uβ act on the qubits representing
the first and the second players respectively. We adopt
the notations
Uα =
(
α0 α1
−α∗1 α∗0
)
, Uβ =
(
β0 β1
−β∗1 β∗0
)
, (2)
with complex numbers satisfying the conditions |α0|2 +
|α1|2 = 1 and |β0|2 + |β1|2 = 1. The payoff of the game
to the first player is given by
Π(α, β) = 〈αβ|Q|αβ〉 , (3)
where the quantum game operatorQ is set to be diagonal
with respect to basis qubits of both players
〈i′j′|Q|ij〉 = δi′,iδj′,jAij , (4)
where Aij is the classical game matrix. With the def-
initions αi =
√
xie
iξi and βi =
√
yie
iυi , the payoff Π
depends only on the absolute values of αi and βi, and
takes the form
Π(x, y) =
∑
i,j
xiAijyj (5)
which is identical to the payoff of the purely classical
mixed strategies that are described by the strategy den-
sity vectors x = (x0, x1) and y = (y0, y1) with conditions
x0 + x1 = 0 and y0 + y1 = 1. Because of the symmetry
of the system, the payoff for the player 2 is given by the
conjugate payoff
Π†(x, y) = Π(y, x). (6)
Clearly, we have Π(x, x) = Π†(x, x), which simply means
both players with same strategy earn the same payoff.
A mixed Nash equilibrium x⋆ is defined by the condi-
tion
∂xiΠ(x, y)|x=y=x⋆ = 0, (7)
with the implied assumption that it gives local maximum,
not minimum. This strategy x⋆ is the best response
of a player against an openent playing his/her best re-
sponse. Since our game is symmetric, both players should
play the same strategy x⋆ to obtain the expected payoff
Π(x⋆, x⋆). There are, however, special cases where there
is no solution to (7) within the valid range 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,
2in which case, the best response becomes the pure Nash
equilibrium, x⋆ = (0, 1) or (1, 0), depending on the sign
of ∂xiΠ(x, y).
The Nash equilibrium, obtained as the result of indi-
vidual pursuit of optimality, is not always an ideal out-
come for both players. In fact, if we consider Π(x, x) as
a function of strategy density x, and seek the value of x
that maximizes this function by
∂xiΠ(x, x)|x=x◦ = 0, (8)
the strategy vector x◦ is Pareto efficient, or both players
are best off, assuming this extremum is indeed a maxi-
mum. If a x⋆ is equal to x◦ the outcome of the game is
described as Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. Consid-
ering the relation
∂xiΠ(x, x) = ∂xi{Π(x, y) + Π†(x, y)}
∣∣
x=y
, (9)
we see that a game with the self-adjoint payoff has a
Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium, namely,
x⋆ = x◦ if Π†(x, y) = Π(x, y), (10)
because simultaneous constraints (7) and (8) hold for this
case. When, on the other hand, the Nash equilibrium
x⋆ is remote from the Pareto efficient value x◦, the out-
come of the game is less than optimal for both players.
This is the situation where the term dilemma is invoked,
the representative of which is the well-known Prisoner’s
dilemma, that has been the subject of much studies. In
fact, we might even say that the search of the dynamics
that brings Pareto efficient outcome to dilemma games
constitute the bulk part of the recent works in evolution-
ary game theory.
Quantum strategies, which has been offered as an ex-
otic alternative to the solution of dilemma games, devi-
ate from the classical strategies with the introduction of
quantum correlations. Following the scheme of Eisert,
Wilkens, and Lewenstein [2], we define
Jγ = e−i
γ
2
σ2
⊗
σ2 (11)
to obtain a correlated state
Jγ |00〉 = cos γ
2
|00〉+ i sin γ
2
|11〉 , (12)
and construct a correlated quantum strategy vector
|Ψαβ(γ)〉 = J †γUαβJγ |00〉 . (13)
The payoff to the first player now becomes
Πγ(α, β) = 〈Ψαβ(γ)|Q|Ψαβ(γ)〉 . (14)
With the split of Uαβ into real and imaginary components
Uαβ = Rαβ + iIαβ , we obtain
Πγ(α, β) = 〈00|
(
R†αβQRαβ + I†αβQIαβ
)
|00〉 (15)
− sin2 γ
{
〈00| I†αβQIαβ |00〉 − 〈11| I†αβQIαβ |11〉
}
−2 sinγ 〈11| I†αβQRαβ |00〉 .
We write the payoff for the first player in an analogous
form to the classical case, (5) using the strategy densities
x and y of the first and the second players;
Πγ(α, β) =
∑
i,j
xiBij(γ)yj . (16)
The effective payoff matrix Bij(γ) is written as
Bij(γ) = Aij +B
exc
ij (γ) +B
cor
ij (γ), (17)
where the “exchange” contribution Bexcij (γ) comming
from thesecond terms of (15) is given by
Bexcij (γ) = − sin2 γ sin2(ξi + υj)(Aij −Ai¯j¯), (18)
and the “correlation” contribution Bcorij (γ) coming from
the last term is given by
Bcorij (γ) = (−)i+j2 sin γ sin(ξi¯ + υj¯) cos(ξi + υj) (19)
×
√
xi¯yj¯
xiyj
Aij .
Here the bars on top of the indices stand for the logical
complementarity 0¯ = 1 and 1¯ = 0. The correlation term
Bcorij has a singular strategy-density dependence. In this
form, it is obvious that playing a given game specified
by the matrix {Aij} with quantum strategy is formally
equivalent to playing a related, but different game spec-
ified by the matrix {Bij(γ)} with purely classical mixed
strategy.
If we take the “quantum strategy” at its face value,
both amplitudes and phases of α should be optimized
to increase the payoff Πγ(α, β). Same apply for β with
Πγ(β, α), and α and β would settle down at the common
value corresponding to the full quantum Nash equilib-
rium. However, such assumption would require a system
consisting of quantum agents making choice of strate-
gies either with intelligence, or under competitive evo-
lutionary pressure. We might argue that, at this point,
such approach is rather far fetched for real life ecosys-
tems, apart from artificial experimental realizations with
quantum computational circuits. In this article, with the
purpose of analyzing the workings of quantum strategies,
we regard only the amplitudes xi and yi as the optimiz-
ing variables and regard the angles ξi = υi as external
parameters, their equivalence being a natural reflection
of the symmetry of players at the final outcome.
Of all possible quantum strategies, there are four sub-
sets under which contributions from Bcorij disappears.
First is the trivial classical limit (ξ0 = 0, ξ1 = 0) or
(ξ0 =
π
2
, ξ1 =
π
2
), at which we have Bij(γ) = Aij .
The second, more interesting case is what we call pseu-
doclassical limit, (ξ0 = 0, ξ1 =
π
2
) or (ξ0 =
π
2
, ξ1 = 0),
with which we have
Bij(γ) = cos
2 γAij + sin
2 γAji. (20)
For this case, the quantum payoff Πγ(x, y) calculated
from (20) is readily given by
Πγ(x, y) = cos
2 γΠ(x, y) + sin2 γΠ†(x, y). (21)
3A simple classical interpretation of the pseodoclassical
case exist in terms of altruism; that is, a choice of γ
gives a specific game plan, or a style in the selection of
strategies of a player, that incorporate the interest of
other player. For example, adopting Ππ
2
(x, y) = Π†(x, y)
as one’s payoff amounts to exchanging the role of two
players, thus identifying the payoff of the other party
as one’s own, or playing with the totally altruistic game
plan. On the other hand, adopting Π0(x, y) = Π(x, y)
means just stick to one’s own payoff as usual, or playing
with selfish game plan. Anything in between, (0 < γ <
pi/2), gives a game plan which pursue varying mixture of
selfish and altruistic payoff maximization.
A notable consequence of (21) is that, for a given com-
mon strategy for both players, the payoff for quantum
game is identical to that of classical game;
Πγ(x, x) = Π(x, x). (22)
The Nash equilibrium of quantum game play x⋆γ is now
given by
∂xiΠγ(x, y)|x=y=x⋆γ = 0, (23)
and both players end up obtaining the payoff Π(x⋆γ , x
⋆
γ).
Among various game plans with different γ values, the
one with γ = pi/2 occupies a spacial place. Because of
the equal mixture of “selfish” Π(x, y) and “altruistic”
Π†(x, y), we have self-adjointness for the payoff, Ππ
4
(x, y)
= Π†π
4
(x, y). Then, from (10) we obtain a Pareto efficient
Nash equilibrium for γ = pi/4, namely
x⋆π
4
= x◦, (24)
which is the primary result of this article. Among the
pseudoclassical game plans with a given γ, therefore, γ =
pi/4 gives the optimal results for both players, and either
γ = 0 or γ = pi/2 gives the less favorable results.
Thus, within psudoclassical limit, thanks to the crucial
identity (22), we are able to interpret the the quantum
strategies as an effective way to incorporate the altruistic
game plan, which can help improve the outcome of the
game toward the optimal result.
There are two more cases for which the strategy density
dependent term Bcorrij drops out. One of them is the case
of (ξ0 =
π
4
, ξ1 =
π
4
) or (ξ0 =
3π
4
, ξ1 =
3π
4
), with which we
have
Bii(γ) = cos
2 γAii + sin
2 γAi¯¯i, (25)
Bi¯i(γ) = cos
2 γAi¯i + sin
2 γAi¯i.
Another case is (ξ0 =
π
4
, ξ1 =
3π
4
) or (ξ0 =
π
4
, ξ1 =
3π
4
),
with which we have
Bii(γ) = cos
2 γAii + sin
2 γAi¯¯i, (26)
Bi¯i(γ) = Ai¯i.
Although these appear analogous to the altruistic pseu-
doclassical case, there is no immediate interpretation in
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FIG. 1: The Nash equilibrium strategy density x⋆γ1 (bot-
tom) and the payoff Π(x⋆γ , x
⋆
γ) with the classical game (dot-
ted line) and pseudoclassical game (solid lines) for the game
of Prisoner’s dilemma (27). Horizontal axis is the parameter
γ. The classical game play leads to the least favorable pay-
off Π(x⋆) = a with “defecting strategy”x⋆1 = 1. Among the
pseudoclassical Nash equilibrium strategies x⋆γ , γ = pi/4 gives
the Pareto efficient (best possible) payoff.
terms of the classical game, because of the existence of ex-
changed components in diagonal matrix elements. More-
over, there is no such relation as (22) in neither of these
cases, and we have bona fide quantum contribution to
the payoff Πγ(x, x) − Π(x, x), which, by its nature, is
classically non-interpretable.
As such, these cases can be thought of as belonging to
the more general category of generic quantum cases that
are given by arbitrary values for (ξ0, ξ1). We would then
calculate Nash equilibrium for a given set of values of
(ξ0, ξ1) from the full payoff Πγ(α, β), in a fashion analo-
gous to (23). Other than possible numerical assessments,
figuring out the meaning of quantum payoff for generic
quantum cases is beyond the scope of the current work.
In fact, it is unlikely that it is readily interpretable, un-
til we have sound scheme to place the game theory into
the information theoretical framework, which we are still
lacking. Conversely, the true role of the quantum game
theory may be to lay foundation for the information the-
oretic approaches of the game theory.
We illustrate our arguments with a numerical example
on the Prisoner’s dilemma. With positive real numbers
a < b < c, the classical game matrix is given by
{Aij} =
(
b 0
c a
)
. (27)
The Nash equibrium x⋆ = (1 − x⋆1, x⋆1) and its payoff
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FIG. 2: The classical payoff Π(x⋆γ , x
⋆
γ) (bottom) and full
quantum payoff Πγ(x
⋆
γ , x
⋆
γ) (top) are shown for the neighbor-
hood of (ξ0, ξ1) = (0, pi/2).
Π(x⋆, x⋆) for the classical game is
x⋆1 = 1, Π(x
⋆, x⋆) = a. (28)
With the pseudoclassical quantum strategy density x⋆γ =
(1− x⋆γ1, x⋆γ1), they are given by
x⋆γ1 =
1
a+ b− c
(
b− c sin2 γ) , (29)
Π(x⋆γ , x
⋆
γ) =
1
a+ b− c
(
ab− c
2
4
sin2 2γ
)
,
for the case of a+ b < c, and
x⋆γ1 = 0, Π(x
⋆
γ , x
⋆
γ) = b, (30)
for the case of a+b > c. An example of numerical results
corresponding to the first case, (29), is shown in FIG.1.
For separable, but fully quantum case (25), the corre-
sponding results are obtained by replacing both a and b
by their average (a + b)/2 in the formulae. The results
are rather similar to the pseudoclassical case because of
the existence of altruistic exchange components in (25).
For another separable, but fully quantum case (26), there
is no improvement over the classical game play
In FIG.2, We show mumerical example of generic quan-
tum cases of ξ in the neighborhood of pseudoclassical case
ξ0 = 0, ξ1 = pi/2. Both classical payoff Π and full quan-
tum payoff Πγ are shown. When we look at the classi-
cal payoffs, with generic “quantum” choice of strategies,
γ-dependence is changed from the pseudoclassical case.
However, the essential ingredient of the successful strat-
egy at high value of γ – mixture of altruism – is still
intact. The story is similar with full quantum payoff
functions. Although the difference between the quantum
payoff and the classical payoffs are non negligible, the
overall feature does not change very much. While the
results with only particular choices of angle parameters
are shown here, we note that these are rather representa-
tive ones whose characteristics are shared by the results
with other generic parameter values. We also add that
in the fuller approach of “complete quantum strategy”
implementation on the same Prisoner’s dilemma includ-
ing the optimization of angles [2], the stable quantum
Nash equilibrium is numerically found to coincide pre-
cisely with the pseudoclassical limit in our terminology.
In conclusion, we have examined the source of the
“success” of quantum strategies in dilemma games.
We have identified altruism, which is expressed in the
symmetrization of the classical game matrix, as the
main cause. In the process, the pseudoclassical limit of
quantum strategies with its intriguing characteristics is
uncovered.
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